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Croatia remains one of the few fortunate countries in Europe that (so far) managed
to prevent the dreaded exponential rise of ‘the curve’. Our epidemiologic situation
of just above 2,000 infections in a country of 4 million is in no small part a result
of early and restrictive measures implemented to prevent and contain the spread
of SARS-COV-2. The measures range from restrictions on individuals’ freedom of
movement to restrictions of social and economic rights – prohibiting all public and
social gatherings, closing down borders, public transport, schools and kindergartens,
effectively banning all but essential commercial activities. After a 5.5 magnitude
earthquake hit and significantly damaged the nation’s capital Zagreb in the early
morning of March 22nd, a prohibition of leaving one’s place of residence was added
to the list of epidemiologic restrictions aiming to prevent the massive spread of the
disease to the rest of the country by people fleeing yet another natural disaster.
The measures have worked. Many restrictions are now gradually being reduced,
depending on current epidemiologic developments.
Analysing national responses to the coronavirus, the University of Oxford study
found that Croatia was the most rigorous of all the examined countries considering
the actual number of infections. This observation alone inevitably raises a question
of balancing the crisis management in Croatia with public health concerns and the
appropriate and necessary scope of limiting individual rights under the Constitution.
Overall, the Croatian response to Covid-19 might not pose an autocratic threat to the
rule of law as in certain European countries. This is far, however, from suggesting
there have not been significant constitutional challenges, or that we should not
require an enhanced constitutional oversight over apparently quite restrictive
governmental action.
Indeed, the extent of the imposed restrictions notwithstanding, Croatian authorities
refused to declare the state of emergency and legitimize their actions by the
(required) 2/3 parliamentary majority when limiting individuals’ constitutional
rights in the event of a ‘natural disaster’, as stipulated in Article 17 of the Croatian
Constitution. Rather, the Government relied on the existing statutory framework
on civil protection and prevention of infectious diseases – coupled with significant
(yet rather patchwork) legislative amendments to provide a legal basis and an
institutional setting for its far-reaching measures. These two features of Croatian
legal framework – one constitutional and one statutory – are central to monitor the
legal aspects of combat against Covid-19 and its effects on the rule of law in Croatia.
I’ll start with the latter.
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Re-tailoring the institutional and procedural aspects
of the existing statutory framework
At the earliest stages of contemplating how to respond to the pandemic, the Croatian
Prime Minister proposed a parliamentary delegation of quasi-legislative powers to
the Government. This type of mechanism is in principle available under Article 88
of the Constitution, but not when it comes to limiting human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The parliamentary opposition instantly refused.
A compromise was found in authorizing the Civil Protection Authority – a committee
composed of various representatives of the Government and national civil protection
units – to make decisions introducing measures against the spread of coronavirus.
In no small part because of the Authority’s successful results of containing Covid-19,
their continuing public presence, including during daily media conferences, and
the impression of much-needed transparency in crisis governance, the public
perception was initially highly supportive of their work. The dominant public narrative
emphasized expertise, rather than politics in charge of the struggle against our
‘invisible tiny enemy’. This inevitably reflected on the rising positive image of the
Government.
However, the Authority’s decisionmaking soon proved to be far more legally
problematic than its initially positive public image would suggest. Most of their
procedural missteps, described in detail below, came under public focus only
after the media discovered how two experts who were initially the main public
figures of the Croatian struggle against Covid-19 – our Minister of Health Vili
Beroš, a respected medical doctor by profession, and the head of the country’s
main infectious disease hospital, Alemka Markoti# – where not even members
of the Authority despite representing it daily at the media conferences. This
discovery incited a healthy amount of scepticism and criticism of the Authority’s
crisis management hiding behind the smokescreen of expertise. The result was
enhanced scrutiny of the Authority’s work by the public media, legal experts and the
Government’s political opposition alike.
The central legal problem, in a nutshell, was that the Government’s delegation of
powers to the Civil Protection Authority resulted in sidelining certain pre-established
statutory procedures for handling infectious diseases, ultimately resulting in the need
for several legislative amendments to retroactively remedy the legal mess which
was thereby caused. Misrepresenting the legal framework of the Authority’s actions
raised concerns of illegality and a lack of legal certainty, ultimately giving a wide
set of powers limiting constitutional rights to a body lacking political and democratic
accountability.
Formally, the legal basis of all the Authority’s decisions was traced back to Article
22a of the Civil Protection System Act. This amendment of the pre-existing piece of
legislation was passed through the Parliament (by an overwhelming majority of 108
to 1) a mere day before the Authority’s first decision was rendered on March 19th. It
provides that
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‘in case of specific circumstances involving an unpredictable or uncontrollable event
or state endangering the lives and health of citizens … the Civil Protection Authority
renders decisions and guidelines to be implemented by the civil protection authorities
of the local and regional governments. Such decisions and recommendations are
rendered to protect the lives and health of citizens …’.
Legal experts publicly criticized the amendment for severe fundamental rights’
limitations lacking constitutionally required safeguards, also stipulating how the
purpose of the Civil Protection System Act was to coordinate the hierarchy of the civil
protection units on local, regional and national levels, not provide a legal basis for
substantive type of measures undertaken against SARS-COV-2. And indeed, the
underdetermined scope of this provision [other than that measures are implemented
by regional or local units] makes the mandate given to the Authority unclear yet
potentially vast.
The statutory landscape of Croatia’s response to the coronacrisis gets further
complicated as the measures introduced by the Authority to contain the spread of
coronavirus were nowhere prescribed as part of the civil protection system. Rather,
these measures (such as quarantines and restrictions on citizens’ movement) were,
substantively, part of quite another piece of legislation with an entirely different
institutional set-up. Article 47 of the Infectious Diseases Protection Act provides that
such epidemiologic measures are rendered by the Minister of Health on the proposal
of the Croatian Institute for Public Health, not the Civil Protection Authority.
Once discovered, such disregard of the established procedural framework (or
rearranging its institutional and operative setting) grew into a public scandal.
As a result, the Government soon pushed the amendment of the Infectious
Diseases Protection Act through the Parliament authorizing the Authority to enact
epidemiologic measures ‘in cooperation’ with the Ministry of Health and the Croatian
Institute for Public Health, ‘under direct supervision’ of the Government. In so
doing, a number of the Authority’s decisions already issued prior to the amendment
were, effectively, retroactively legitimized. This raises significant problems in light
of the general prohibition of retroactive effect of legislation under Article 90 of the
Constitution ‘unless for exceptionally justified reasons’, which were in the present
legislative process nowhere mentioned nor justified.
Constitutional concerns and the state of emergency
In addition to the aforementioned statutory alterations, the Croatian response to
Covid-19 raises several other constitutional concerns.
The central one pertains to the debate whether or not there was a need to trigger
the constitutional emergency mechanism in imposing the epidemiologic restrictions.
This is highly relevant as in the state of emergency, the parliamentary voting
requirements and the necessary constitutional thresholds needed to justify limitations
of individual rights differ from these rules under ‘normal’ circumstances.
- 3 -
Unlike many other national constitutions, the Croatian Constitution does not
necessitate a parliamentary declaration of the ‘state of emergency’ or provide the
Government with any emergency powers exceeding its regular mandate for as long
as the Parliament is capable of assembling. Rather, its Article 17 stipulates that
constitutional freedoms and rights may be restricted by the Parliament acting on
a 2/3 majority in the event of a ‘natural disaster’ – existing as a matter of fact, not
requiring a legal declaration of the ‘state of emergency’. Only if the Parliament is
unable to convene, which was not the case in present circumstances, such decisions
are made by the President of the Republic at the proposal of the Government and
co-signed by the Prime Minister.
Whether or not the Covid-19 pandemic counts as a ‘natural disaster’, with all the
legal consequences thereof, sparked a heated debate amongst constitutional
experts on social networks and in public media. Putting their differences aside,
the predominant scholarly position was that all newly introduced measures limiting
constitutional rights ought to be legitimized by a more protective 2/3 majority in
the Parliament. As pointed out by Gardasevic, crisis situations by their very nature
necessitate a higher degree of consensus on the proper extent of constitutional
limitations of individual liberties, exceeding the regular parliamentary majority.
The second crucial difference between the legislative process in regular and
emergency situations concerns the standard of scrutiny that a given measure has
to endure in order to justify limitations of constitutional rights and freedoms. Unlike
the regular standard of proportionality under Article 16 of the Constitution, which
requires quite a high threshold of a measure’s necessity to achieve a legitimate
aim, measures enacted in the state of emergency under Article 17 require only a
standard of suitability to protect public health. In other words, the more stringent
voting rules and parliamentary agreement allow for a lower degree of judicial scrutiny
over fundamental rights’ limitations in the case of emergency, when prompt action
and more severe constitutional restrictions are essential to achieve an important
public interest. On the other hand, when the Parliament does not act under the 2/3
majority, the standard required for a measure’s constitutionality is set quite high, to a
measure protecting public health in the least restrictive way possible.
Taking this into account, the constitutionality of recent statutory amendments
introducing new epidemiological measures (such as self-isolation, particularly of
persons suspected of infection) might be brought into question. They were all passed
through a regular legislative procedure.
Even the President of the Parliament and the President of the Republic at a certain
point questioned the type of majority required. The Constitutional Court, however,
refused to join the debate. According to a press statement of its President, the Court
considered there is no ground to intervene or assess the constitutionality of the
adopted measures, invoking rules of procedure allowing decisionmaking only post-
facto and refusing to intervene on its own motion. Quite an interesting development
of this story occurred when one of the three constitutional justices who remained
in minority when forming the Court’s position published a journal article disclosing
his distinctly opposing opinion. Justice Abramovi# quite harshly argued how human
rights are significantly violated under the pretence of ‘caring for the nation’. He
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particularly mentions the examples of circumventing legally valid statutory norms and
misleading the public, the measure of prohibition of leaving one’s place of residence
when such measures are nowhere prescribed in legislation, and questions the
proportionality and even suitability of the measure of self-isolation for close contacts
of infected persons, when a less restrictive alternative to limiting individual freedoms
exists in simply testing for the infection. Justice Abramovi# also equates the intention
of transferring unlimited powers to the Authority to the ‘suspension of democracy’
and a ‘de facto dictatorship’ – insisting how any limitations of constitutional rights and
freedoms in these pandemic times should follow the established procedures and be
passed through the Parliament by a 2/3 majority, not be given to unlimited discretion
of governmental appointees. ‘In the long term, the damage suffered by democracy is
greater than the damage caused by the virus’.
The emergency voting procedures have in the Croatian Parliament never (or not yet)
been activated for the measures related to Covid-19. The public debate surrounding
it, however, managed to incite and successfully activate a mechanism of democratic
control over a final ‘epidemiologic’ measure proposed, and worth mentioning in this
report as perhaps most controversial from a constitutional perspective.
Democratic control
By statutory amendments of the Electronic Media Act, the Government proposed
tracking cellphones for the purpose of protecting national and/or public security
‘when the Minister of Health declares an epidemic of infectious disease or a threat
thereof, whereby health and lives of citizens could not be effectively protected
without processing such data’. This proposal was – perhaps even too obviously – an
unfettered limitation of citizens’ right to privacy with no safety mechanisms installed.
Early in the legislative procedure, the Government’s initiative was successfully
blocked by amendments proposed by the opposition and heavily criticized in the
media for its lack of constitutionally warranted safeguards crucial for an effective
democratic oversight, including temporal or personal limitations. The proposal, at
least so far, stands still in the hands of the Government and is unlikely to return – at
least not in the form initially proposed.
This example, together with the continued debate on the proper parliamentary
majority to limit the citizens’ rights, serve to demonstrate the relative maturity
of the Croatian liberal democratic system. Operating through interaction of the
political process, free media and public debate, democratic checks and balances
in Croatia seem to have worked, restraining the attempts of excess governmental
encroachment on fundamental rights and constitutional liberties.
To that extent, the rule of law in Croatia may not be under direct threat of autocracy.
This does not mean, however, that the Covid-19 pandemic is not continuously
testing the constitutional limits of overreaching governmental action.
In fact, some of the most recent decisions of the Civil Protection Authority on the
relaxation of epidemiologic measures have already caused new concerns. In light
of the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Authority was accused of leading the
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(centre-right) ruling majority’s political campaign, as they moved to allow religious
services much sooner than all other social gatherings; or even prohibited Sunday
work under the pretence of limiting the stores’ working hours, even though such
prohibitions were previously declared unconstitutional. Moreover, the Constitutional
Court has already received at least 16 motions against the controversial statutory
amendments or the Authority’s decisions claimed as far too restrictive, failing to
proportionately achieve the aim of protecting public health. These constitutional
challenges of Croatian epidemiological measures will most certainly not be the last.
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